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AND BEYOND
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INTRODUCTION
From a distance, the moon appears bright, shiny, and attractive. It is
revered and romanticized. Lives (and deaths) are planned around its phases
and cycles. But, upon closer inspection, this attractive object is actually
scarred—pocked with craters left by past violent impacts. For same-sex
couples, federal tax equality shares a strikingly similar duality.
In its eagerly anticipated decision in United States v. Windsor, the U.S.
Supreme Court invalidated Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA) in a suit where a surviving same-sex spouse sought a refund
of federal estate taxes.1 Before its demise, DOMA purported to defend
against the onslaught of same-sex couples seeking to destroy “traditional”
marriage.2 Departing from the federal government’s long tradition of
deferring to state law on questions of marital status, DOMA denied federal
recognition to same-sex marriages recognized under state law.3 In Windsor,
DOMA operated to “protect” traditional marriage by forcing an estate to
pay $363,053 of federal estate tax on a transfer of property to the (female)
decedent’s (female) spouse, when the decedent’s estate would have owed
nothing had the transfer been to the (female) decedent’s (male) spouse.4
With DOMA now relegated to the constitutional dustbin, it would seem that
all married couples—regardless of gender and sexual orientation—are on an
equal legal plane (at least from the perspective of federal law).
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Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C.
§ 7 (2012)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2–3 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906–07
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argument that under the Internal Revenue Code a federal court is bound by state law rather than federal
law when attempting to construe marital status.”); H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2–3, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2906–07.
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Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.

110

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY

In the abstract, invalidating DOMA and its unequal treatment of
married couples based on their gender and sexual orientation is appealing.
Like the moon, it draws us in with its own romanticized sort of beauty. But
when we come face to face with legal equality, we may find that it is not so
bright, shiny, and attractive. What we will learn is that federal tax equality
is pocked and scarred by the impact of past legal battles that make it less
promising and attractive. Indeed, we will find that “equality” is decidedly
not equal, and that the federal tax situation post-Windsor may be markedly
worse than pre-Windsor.
In Part I of this Essay, I describe the path that led to the decision in
Windsor. Then, in Part II, I turn to describing the ways in which the postWindsor tax terrain may actually be worse for same-sex couples than the
bleak tax landscape they faced before that decision. This is important
because, while other federal laws will apply to some couples some of the
time, the federal tax laws are a concern for all of us on an annual (or even
more frequent) basis. Under DOMA, same-sex couples already faced a
debilitating level of uncertainty in determining how the federal tax laws
applied to their relationships. Post-Windsor, same-sex couples will see this
uncertainty multiply—even after receiving guidance from the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) on the implementation of the Windsor decision in
the federal tax context. They will have to grapple not only with lingering
questions surrounding the federal tax treatment of relationships that are not
recognized, but also with new questions regarding whether and how their
relationships will be recognized for federal tax purposes. Moreover, it
seems that dispatching discrimination designed to erode the progress of
same-sex couples toward formal equality has served only to entrench the
privileged status of marriage in our federal tax laws rather than to foster the
recognition of a broader array of human relationships. This Essay ends with
brief concluding remarks.
I. EQUALITY ARRIVED
From 1996 until 2013, Section 3 of DOMA provided that, for purposes
of federal law, “the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”5 The effect
of this provision was to deny same-sex couples the important tax benefits
(and to spare them the tax detriments) that accompany marriage. Following
its enactment, DOMA was the subject of legal challenges, the earliest of
which found that the statute passed constitutional muster.6 The
constitutional tide began to turn, however, in the late 2000s. Unsurprisingly,
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Defense of Marriage Act § 3(a).
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6
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a number of these decisions centered specifically on DOMA’s application
to the federal tax laws.
Starting in 2010, the federal court decisions invalidating Section 3 of
DOMA began to accumulate. First, in Gill v. Office of Personnel
Management,7 a U.S. district court found “that ‘there exists no fairly
conceivable set of facts that could ground a rational relationship’ between
DOMA and a legitimate government objective.”8 Gill involved an equal
protection challenge to DOMA’s denial of a number of federal benefits
(including federal income tax benefits) to a group of same-sex couples. In
that case, the court found that DOMA “violate[d] core constitutional
principles of equal protection”9 and that all of the proffered rationales for
enacting DOMA were implausible.10 According to the court, the only
plausible explanation was that DOMA was borne of “irrational prejudice”
and “animus” toward same-sex couples.11
In 2012, three additional district courts invalidated DOMA, and a
federal appellate court did so for the first time. In Dragovich v. U.S.
Department of the Treasury,12 a group of California public employees
challenged the constitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA and its interaction
with I.R.C. § 7702B(f). These laws prevented the employees’ same-sex
spouses and registered domestic partners from enrolling in the state’s longterm care plan, which is afforded favorable federal tax treatment. The U.S.
district court found that neither DOMA nor § 7702B(f) bore any rational
relationship to a legitimate government interest. To the contrary, the court
found that both statutes were motivated by actual or apparent antigay
animus.13 Accordingly, the court held that both statutes violated the
plaintiffs’ equal protection rights.14 In Pedersen v. Office of Personnel
Management,15 another U.S. district court considered a challenge similar to
that in Gill. Although the Pedersen court determined that sexual orientation
classifications should be subject to heightened scrutiny, it concluded that
Section 3 of DOMA could not survive even rational basis review.16 In
Windsor v. United States,17 another U.S. district court found that Section 3
of DOMA violated the equal protection rights of a surviving same-sex
7

699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2887 (2013).
8
Id. at 387 (footnote omitted) (quoting Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2005)).
9
Id.
10
See id. at 396.
11
Id. at 396–97.
12
872 F. Supp. 2d 944 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
13
Id. at 955.
14
Id. at 959, 964.
15
881 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D. Conn. 2012).
16
Id. at 334.
17
833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d sub nom. United States
v. Windsor 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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spouse when the surviving spouse had been required to bear the burden of
federal estate taxes because she was unable to qualify for the estate tax
marital deduction.18
In May 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed
the Gill decision, issuing the first ruling from a federal appellate court
finding Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional. In its decision, the First
Circuit was diffident, asserting that DOMA would actually survive the
traditional rational basis test because “Congress could rationally have
believed that DOMA would reduce costs, even if newer studies of the actual
economic effects of DOMA suggest that it may in fact raise costs for the
federal government.”19 Ultimately, however, the First Circuit decided that
“the extreme deference accorded to ordinary economic legislation” was
inappropriate in light of the federalism concerns raised by DOMA’s
intrusion “on matters customarily within state control.”20 Accordingly, the
court instead applied a more searching form of rational basis scrutiny, as
had been done in other cases where a classification targets a “historically
disadvantaged or unpopular” group.21 Disavowing any reliance upon
antigay animus as a basis for its decision, the First Circuit held that DOMA
could not pass muster under this more searching form of rational basis
scrutiny, stating that “[s]everal of the reasons given [in support of DOMA]
do not match the statute and several others are diminished by specific
holdings in Supreme Court decisions more or less directly on point.”22
Just seven months later, the U.S. Supreme Court decided to hear an
appeal in Windsor.23 On June 26, 2013, a sharply divided Supreme Court
issued a decision in that case invalidating Section 3 of DOMA.24 In the
majority opinion, the Windsor Court elided the question of the appropriate
standard of review under equal protection analysis; however, it did seem to
apply something more than traditional rational basis review to the
taxpayer’s claim.25 In reaching its decision, the majority drew upon
federalism concerns—given that questions of marital status have
historically been left to the states—but relied more directly upon the antigay
animus underlying DOMA’s enactment.26 Ultimately, the Court held that
18

Id. at 396; see also I.R.C. § 2056 (2006).
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2887 (2013).
20
Id. at 11, 13.
21
Id. at 10–11.
22
Id. at 15.
23
Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, cert granted, 133 S. Ct. 768 (2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013).
24
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675.
25
See id. at 2693 (subjecting DOMA to “careful consideration”); see also id. at 2706 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (observing that the majority “does not apply anything that resembles th[e] deferential
framework” of rational basis analysis).
26
Id. at 2689–96 (majority opinion).
19
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Section 3 of DOMA “is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the
purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its
marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”27
II. NOT SO EQUAL AFTER ALL
In the absence of Section 3 of DOMA, the question of whether samesex couples are considered married for federal tax purposes is determined
by reference to state law. Thus, same-sex couples are now ostensibly on the
same legal footing as different-sex couples for purposes of federal tax law.
In reality, however, invalidating Section 3 of DOMA does not, by itself,
bring about tax equality in any meaningful sense. Nor does it merely return
same-sex couples to the status quo of blanket discrimination that preceded
the enactment of DOMA. Instead, because of the pocks and scars left by
legal battles that took place in the shadow of DOMA, invalidating Section 3
of DOMA will likely worsen the legal position of same-sex couples and
further entrench the privileging of marriage in the federal tax laws.
A. A Shifted and Shifting Legal Landscape
Fearing that the Hawaii courts were poised to legally recognize samesex marriages, Congress was motivated to codify what was then the norm of
denying legal recognition to same-sex relationships.28 In other words,
Congress’s enactment of Section 3 of DOMA merely substituted a single
federal rule denying legal recognition to same-sex relationships for fifty
state rules that had previously had the same effect. Accordingly, from the
perspective of same-sex couples, Section 3 of DOMA had no immediate
impact on how they were treated under federal law—they were treated the
same the day after Congress enacted DOMA as they had been the day
before.
The legal landscape at the state level did change for same-sex couples,
but not as quickly or in the way that Congress had envisioned. It was not
until 1999, when Vermont created the first “civil union” regime in the
United States,29 that the first state extended all of the rights and obligations
of marriage to same-sex couples. And it was not until 2003 that
Massachusetts became the first state to extend the right to marry to samesex couples.30 Since then, same-sex couples have experienced significant
advances in obtaining legal recognition for their relationships.
At the time of this Essay’s publication, the District of Columbia and
thirteen states (i.e., California, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Maine,
27

Id. at 2696.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 10 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2914.
29
Act Relating to Civil Unions, § 3, 2000 Vt. Adv. Legis. Serv. 91 (LexisNexis).
30
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
28
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Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode
Island, Vermont, and Washington) permit same-sex couples to marry.31 Five
other states (i.e., Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, and Oregon) do not
permit same-sex marriages, but do permit same-sex couples to enter into
legally equivalent relationships.32 Two states (i.e., Colorado and Wisconsin)
only permit same-sex couples to enter into legal relationships that afford
something less than all of the rights and obligations of marriage.33 In
contrast, thirty-five states have a constitutional or statutory prohibition
against same-sex marriage.34 Interestingly, among the states that prohibit
same-sex marriage, only twenty-nine afford no legal recognition to samesex relationships.35 The other six states actually do legally recognize samesex relationships—four of them have civil union or domestic partnership
regimes that withhold nothing from same-sex couples other than the
marriage label, and the other two permit same-sex couples to enter into
relationships with lesser rights and obligations.
Now forced to abandon its uniform federal definition of (non)marriage
for same-sex couples, the federal government will not simply return to
relying upon a uniform set of state rules that will have the same effect.
Instead, invalidating Section 3 of DOMA will cause the federal government
to embrace a significantly changed legal landscape for purposes of
determining who is (or is not) married for federal tax purposes. This legal
landscape is not only far different from the one that existed in 1996 but also
a complex and ever-shifting one.
The shifting landscape is largely a product of federalism and its
supposed incarnation in Section 2 of DOMA. Section 2 of DOMA purports
to authorize states to refuse legal recognition to same-sex marriages validly
contracted in other states.36 The ostensible purpose of this provision is to
permit each state to make the decision whether to legally recognize samesex relationships, without having to give effect to another state’s choice
regarding this question.37 The practical impact of this provision is to cause
31

HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, MARRIAGE EQUALITY AND OTHER RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION
LAWS (2013), available at http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/marriage_equality_082013.pdf.
32
Id.
33
Id. Colorado has enacted a civil union regime that purports to afford same-sex couples all of the
rights and obligations of marriage. S. 13-011, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013) (enacting
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-15-107). However, this law specifically withheld from same-sex couples the
right to file joint state income tax returns on the ground that Colorado’s income tax incorporates the
federal income tax by reference, at the time of the regime’s enactment, and same-sex couples were not
permitted to file joint federal income tax returns. Id. § 14-15-117.
34
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATEWIDE MARRIAGE PROHIBITIONS (2013), available at
http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/marriage_prohibitions_072013.pdf.
35
Compare id., with HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, MARRIAGE EQUALITY AND OTHER RELATIONSHIP
RECOGNITION LAWS, supra note 31.
36
See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
37
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 6–10 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2910–14.
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the legal recognition of same-sex relationships to appear and disappear as
couples cross state borders. For example, a same-sex couple married in
Massachusetts will see the legal recognition of their relationship disappear
when they visit Pennsylvania or enter into a transaction in Ohio because
those states refuse to legally recognize same-sex relationships.38 Even
among the states that legally recognize same-sex relationships, it is not
clear that the Massachusetts couple’s marriage would be honored. For
instance, Nevada and Oregon may recognize the couple’s relationship as a
domestic partnership (but not as a marriage); however, it appears that the
couple would have to separately register as domestic partners in those states
before their relationship would be recognized.39 In contrast, a different-sex
couple married in Massachusetts would not encounter any uncertainty
regarding the recognition of their relationship because their relationship
would be recognized in every state as a routine matter.40
B. Uncertainty, Uncertainty, and More Uncertainty
1. Uncertainty Pre-Windsor.—Even under DOMA’s ostensibly
simple rule of legal nonrecognition, same-sex couples faced debilitating
uncertainty regarding the application of the federal tax laws to their
relationships. Decreeing that same-sex couples were not married for federal
tax purposes answered many simple questions—for example, same-sex
couples could not file joint federal income tax returns41 or benefit from the
rules that shield property transfers between spouses from tax. 42 But DOMA
did nothing to tell same-sex couples how the tax laws applied to their
relationships in more ambiguous circumstances. For instance, same-sex
couples with unequal earnings who commingled their finances were given
no guidance on how to treat the transfer that effectively took place each
year from the higher-earning spouse to the lower-earning spouse. Yet this is
just the type of entanglement and commitment that would be expected of
couples and that has been relied upon to make marital status a factor in

38

OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (2010).
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122A.500 (LexisNexis 2010); OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a (prohibiting the
legal recognition of same-sex marriages); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 106.300–.340 (2011) (establishing a
domestic partnership regime but containing no provision regarding the recognition of out-of-state legal
relationships as domestic partnerships); BASIC RIGHTS OR., DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP RESOURCE GUIDE
4 (2007) (advising same-sex couples to register as domestic partners in Oregon, even if they have
obtained a domestic partnership or civil union in another state), available at
http://www.basicrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/BRO-Domestic-Partnership-Resource-Guide2008.pdf.
40
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 283–84 (1971).
41
I.R.C. § 6013(a) (2006).
42
Id. §§ 1041, 2056, 2523.
39
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determining tax consequences.43 The courts and the IRS did little to fill this
gap.44 Indeed, in 2010, the National Taxpayer Advocate “sharply criticized
the IRS for failing to provide generally applicable, precedential guidance to
same-sex couples concerning the application of the federal tax laws to
them.”45
Returning to a derivative definition of marriage for federal tax
purposes promises only to multiply the debilitating tax uncertainty that
accompanied DOMA. Now, in addition to figuring out how to apply the tax
laws to their relationships when they are not recognized, same-sex couples
will have to figure out when their relationships will be recognized for
federal tax purposes. The question of who is married—and when—arises
because of the interaction of (1) the patchwork of state recognition of samesex relationships with (2) the less-than-clear rules for determining a
couple’s marital status.46 Justice Scalia was, therefore, absolutely correct
when he pointed out in his dissent in Windsor that striking down DOMA
raises “difficult choice-of-law issues.”47
2. Uncertainty Post-Windsor.—In the wake of Windsor, President
Obama “directed his administration to find ways to make sure gay couples

43

For a fuller explanation of the uncertainties faced by same-sex couples under DOMA, see
Anthony C. Infanti, Deconstructing the Duty to the Tax System: Unfettering Zealous Advocacy on
Behalf of Lesbian and Gay Taxpayers, 61 TAX LAW. 407, 423–36 (2008).
44
Anthony C. Infanti, LGBT Taxpayers: A Collision of “Others,” 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 18–20
(2012).
45
Id. at 19; see also 1 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., I.R.S., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE: 2012
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 450 (2012) (indicating that, since the issuance of its 2010 report
containing this criticism, “the IRS has published guidance for relatively discrete populations” of samesex couples).
46
In the absence of controlling rules in the Internal Revenue Code or Treasury Regulations, the
courts and the IRS have articulated a number of different standards for determining choice of law
questions regarding marital status. Many courts have stated that the law of the couple’s domicile
controls. See, e.g., Boyer v. Comm’r, 732 F.2d 191, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Other courts have referred to
the legally distinct concept of the taxpayer’s residence in determining which state’s law controls. See,
e.g., Peveler v. Comm’r, 48 T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 79,460 (1979). Yet other authorities have disregarded the
current state of residence or domicile and have looked to the law of the state where the marriage was
entered into. See, e.g., Chagra v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 91,366, at 91-1839 n.3 (1991); Rev. Rul.
58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60. In the context of determining whether a marriage has ended (and a new one has
begun) and whether a couple could file a joint return, the IRS has respected one state’s waiving of
another state’s waiting period for remarriage following a divorce. Rev. Rul. 29, 1953-1 C.B. 67. In
addition, some courts have honored a divorce granted by a state other than the state of marital domicile,
notwithstanding that a court in the state of marital domicile had ruled that the divorce was invalid. E.g.,
Feinberg v. Comm’r, 198 F.2d 260, 263 (3d Cir. 1952). For married different-sex couples, many of the
difficult issues that same-sex couples will now face have likely been elided because of the easy
portability of a different-sex couple’s marital status throughout the United States. See supra note 40 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the IRS’s position on this question with respect to same-sex
marriages, see infra note 49 and accompanying text.
47
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2708 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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receive[] the benefits for which they [a]re now eligible.”48 Just two months
later, the IRS issued its first guidance implementing the Windsor decision.
Under that guidance, the IRS will recognize “a marriage of same-sex
individuals that was validly entered into in a state whose laws authorize the
marriage of two individuals of the same sex even if the married couple is
domiciled in a state that does not recognize the validity of same-sex
marriages.”49 The IRS chose this rule to avoid the difficult questions that
would arise if marital status were determined based on the taxpayer’s
domicile, with marriages possibly appearing and disappearing each time a
taxpayer moves.50 According to the Secretary of the Treasury, this “ruling
provides certainty and clear, coherent tax-filing guidance for all legally
married same-sex couples nationwide.”51 Upon closer inspection, however,
this ruling provides no more than the same veneer of clarity that DOMA
did, as it leaves important questions unanswered, lays traps for the unwary,
creates inequities, and entails unfortunate (and, hopefully, unintended)
consequences.
a. Evasive marriages.—At different points in its guidance, the
IRS speaks of recognizing the marriages of same-sex couples who are
“lawfully married” or a marriage that was “valid in the state where it was
entered into.”52 This raises a question regarding what the IRS means when it
refers to “valid” or “lawful” marriages. Will the IRS require only that the
couple have observed the legal formalities imposed by the state of
celebration? Or does the IRS have a broader notion of validity in mind?
In its guidance, the IRS seems to address only the situation faced by
couples in so-called migratory marriages. In other words, the IRS seems to
focus on couples who are domiciled in a state that recognizes same-sex
marriage, who marry in that state, and who later move to a state that refuses
to recognize their marriage:
Under this rule, individuals of the same sex will be considered to be
lawfully married under the Code as long as they were married in a state whose
laws authorize the marriage of two individuals of the same sex, even if they
are domiciled in a state that does not recognize the validity of same-sex
marriages. For over half a century, for Federal income tax purposes, the
Service has recognized marriages based on the laws of the state in which they
were entered into, without regard to subsequent changes in domicile, to
achieve uniformity, stability, and efficiency in the application and
administration of the Code. Given our increasingly mobile society, it is
48
Michael D. Shear, Obama, in Africa, Praises U.S. Ruling on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (June 27,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/world/africa/obama-in-africa.html.
49
Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201.
50
See id.
51
Annie Lowrey, IRS to Recognize Gay Couples, Regardless of State Measures, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, Aug. 30, 2013, at A-6.
52
Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201.
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important to have a uniform rule of recognition that can be applied with
certainty by the Service and taxpayers alike for all Federal tax purposes. Those
overriding tax administration policy goals generally apply with equal force in
the context of same-sex marriages.53

This passage makes it clear that the status of migratory couples will not
change merely by reason of a change of domicile. The paragraphs that
immediately follow this passage reinforce the impression that the IRS only
had migratory marriages in mind when it drafted the revenue ruling, as
these paragraphs focus exclusively on the advantages of a uniform approach
when couples change their domicile by moving from state to state.54
But what about couples who enter into so-called evasive marriages?
An evasive marriage occurs when a couple domiciled in a state that does
not recognize same-sex marriage travels to another state to marry and
immediately returns to their state of domicile to live. For instance, a
Pennsylvania same-sex couple might travel to New York to marry and then
return to Pennsylvania to live as a couple. Regarding the validity of this
marriage, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides that “[a]
marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage
was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the
strong public policy of another state which had the most significant
relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.”55
A court applying the Restatement (as Pennsylvania has done in the past)
could invalidate this evasive marriage because the couple’s state of
domicile (i.e., Pennsylvania) has a strong public policy against same-sex
marriage.56
Are the many same-sex couples in evasive marriages now considered
“married” for federal tax purposes?57 The IRS guidance does not even
53

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
55
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971) (emphasis added).
56
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1704 (2013) (“It is hereby declared to be the strong and longstanding
public policy of this Commonwealth that marriage shall be between one man and one woman. A
marriage between persons of the same sex which was entered into in another state or foreign
jurisdiction, even if valid where entered into, shall be void in this Commonwealth.”); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) cmt. k (“To date . . . a marriage has only been invalidated
when it violated a strong policy of a state where at least one of the spouses was domiciled at the time of
the marriage and where both made their home immediately thereafter.”); see In re Estate of Lenherr, 314
A.2d 255, 258–59 (Pa. 1974) (applying the Restatement in determining whether an evasive marriage to a
paramour should be recognized for inheritance-tax purposes).
57
And if these marriages are invalid, could the IRS treat these same-sex couples as married for
federal tax purposes even if it wished to? Where does the IRS derive the authority to recognize
marriages that are invalid; that is, that are not really marriages at all under state law? This would
certainly go well beyond the IRS’s authority to interpret the Internal Revenue Code because it would put
the IRS in the position of establishing its own rules for marriage. See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006).
Furthermore, it seems logically inconsistent for the IRS, on the one hand, to legally recognize the
relationships of couples who have made a legally ineffectual commitment to each other (but who have
54
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acknowledge—much less address—this category of marriages. Is it enough
that these couples satisfied the legal formalities imposed by the state where
they were married? Or, as the IRS guidance seems to say, are they now
compelled to obtain expensive legal opinions regarding the validity of their
marriages prior to filing their tax returns or even reporting to their
employers that they are married (so that their fringe benefits are
appropriately treated for tax purposes)? What if a same-sex couple cannot
afford a legal opinion? Do they risk penalties if the position they take on
their tax return proves to be incorrect?58
Even if evasive marriages are recognized, that will have the effect of
drawing a line between the haves and have-nots. In other words, it would
create a legal distinction between two classes of same-sex couples residing
in the same state: those who can afford to travel to, and marry in, another
state that recognizes same-sex marriage and those who cannot afford to do
so. In an unfortunate intersection of class with marital status, the federal tax
treatment of same-sex couples would then turn on whether a couple is
wealthy enough to travel across state lines to marry.
b. Continued relevance of state law.—Notwithstanding the
claim that the IRS guidance is “clear” and “coherent” and provides
“certainty,”59 there are many tax questions that it does not raise or answer.
The IRS guidance only provides the rule for determining marital status
where the Internal Revenue Code directly makes marriage relevant to the
determination of tax consequences. As stated in the guidance, “[f]or Federal
tax purposes, the terms ‘spouse,’ ‘husband and wife,’ ‘husband,’ and ‘wife’
include an individual married to a person of the same sex if the individuals
are lawfully married under state law, and the term ‘marriage’ includes such
a marriage between individuals of the same sex.”60 There are, however,
many instances in which marital status is relevant to the determination of
federal tax consequences only indirectly through the application of state
law. The IRS guidance does not address these situations, and, in the absence
of a federal rule, state law will control. But which state’s law?
For example, the existence of a parent–child relationship can be
relevant to determining the federal tax treatment of both the parent and the
child. The existence of parent–child relationships, which often turn on the

nonetheless managed to obtain a piece of paper from a state with the word marriage on it) and, on the
other hand, to refuse to legally recognize the relationships of the many couples who have made the same
commitment in a fashion that actually affords them all of the legal rights and obligations of marriage
(but who have only managed to obtain a piece of paper from the state with the words civil union or
domestic partnership on it). See infra Part II.B.2.d.
58
See I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1), (c) (applying a penalty for “[n]egligence or disregard of rules or
regulations”). Taxpayers may avoid the penalty if they can demonstrate reasonable cause for their
underpayment of tax and that they acted in good faith. Id. § 6664(c).
59
Lowrey, supra note 51.
60
Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201.
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marital status of the parents, will continue to be determined under state law.
Under the IRS guidance, a same-sex couple living in a state that recognizes
same-sex marriage, who marry there, and who later move to a state that
refuses to recognize their marriage will continue to be treated as married for
federal tax purposes. If this couple has one or more children after the move,
which state’s law will determine parentage? The choice of law can be
important because the state of the marriage’s celebration might have treated
both spouses as parents of the child automatically,61 but the new state—one
that refuses to recognize the couple’s relationship—might provide no means
for establishing a legal relationship between the child and the nonbiological
parent.62
Will such a child be a “qualifying child” of the nonbiological parent
for federal tax purposes? Will the child be considered related to the
nonbiological parent for purposes of rules attributing ownership from
parents to children (or vice versa)?63 What if the nonbiological parent passes
away and neither the spouse nor the child are to receive any of the
decedent’s property under a will or intestate succession, but a relative who
is to receive the property wishes to disclaim in favor of the surviving spouse
or child and to transfer the property directly to them? Will that be an
effective disclaimer for federal estate and gift tax purposes if the property
would have passed to the surviving spouse or child under the laws of the
state of the marriage’s celebration but not under the law of the state of the
decedent’s domicile?64
The IRS guidance does not address how far it will apply the law of the
state of a marriage’s celebration for federal tax purposes. It is thus unclear
whether the federal tax laws will afford same-sex couples all of the rights
and obligations that would have attended their marriages had they remained
domiciliaries of the state of celebration. This is just the type of uncertainty
that the IRS guidance purports to eliminate when it eschews determining
marital status based on domicile and instead applies the law of the place of
celebration. The burden of grappling with the uncertainties raised by this
lacuna will fall on same-sex couples, who will now require the aid of
expensive tax lawyers and accountants to resolve these questions (if they
61

See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 46, § 4B (LexisNexis 2006) (“Any child born to a married
woman as a result of artificial insemination with the consent of her husband, shall be considered the
legitimate child of the mother and such husband.”); see also Della Corte v. Ramirez, 961 N.E.2d 601,
602–03 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (finding that a lesbian couple who conceived through artificial
insemination, married in the state, and then gave birth to a child in the same state, resulted in the child
being a legitimate child of both parties).
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HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, PARENTING LAWS: SECOND PARENT OR STEPPARENT ADOPTION
(2013), available at http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/parenting_second-parent-adoption_
082013.pdf.
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See I.R.C. §§ 152(a)(1), 267(b)(1), 267(c)(4), 318(a)(1); id. § 152(c) (Supp. 2012).
64
Id. § 2518(c)(3); H.R. REP. NO. 97-201, at 190–91, reprinted in 1981-2 C.B. 352, 392 (“Local
law will be applicable to determine the identity of the transferee.”).
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can be resolved at all). Again implicating the intersection of class with
marital status, wealthier same-sex couples will be better positioned to seek
this aid. The many same-sex couples who cannot afford expensive tax
advice will be left to answer these questions themselves—or, more likely,
they may simply throw up their hands in frustration.
c. Traps for the unwary.—The IRS guidance also lays
potentially dangerous traps for the unwary. For instance, the Supreme
Court’s same-sex marriage decision renewed attention on the plight of
married same-sex couples who split up in states that refuse to let them
divorce.65 These couples have learned the hard way that many states
recognizing same-sex marriage impose strict residency requirements for
divorce, leaving them no legal way out of their marriages.66 For married
same-sex couples in this situation, the IRS guidance raises difficult (and, for
some, nearly insuperable) hurdles to severing their marital relationships for
federal tax purposes.
Under current tax law, the IRS cannot treat a couple as unmarried
without state sanction. For filing purposes, a couple continues to be treated
as married until a court issues a divorce or separation decree.67 Neither
living apart nor signing a separation agreement will sever the marital
relationship for this purpose.68 As a practical matter, this means that samesex couples who separate but cannot divorce must either file joint federal
tax returns (and be on the hook for each other’s tax bills) or file as married
filing separately.
Married filing separately is not an attractive option, as evidenced by
the very few taxpayers who choose this filing status.69 The married filing
separately tax rates are higher than those for a joint return and, for some
taxpayers, higher than those even for a single return.70 If one spouse filing
separately itemizes deductions, then the other is denied the standard
deduction.71 And married filing separately results in the reduction or
complete denial of a variety of tax benefits, including the dependent care
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E.g., Margaret Klaw, Gay Divorce, the Next Frontier, WASH. POST (July 5, 2013),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-05/opinions/40390073_1_marriage-equality-marriagelicense-marriage-act.
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E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, §§ 4–5 (LexisNexis 2011).
67
See I.R.C. §§ 1, 2, 7703(a)(2).
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BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES & GIFTS
¶ 111.3.6 (2013) (“Since a decree is required, separation agreements do not terminate the marriage for
tax purposes . . . .”).
69
I.R.S. Pub. No. 1304, Individual Income Tax Returns 2010, at 39–40 tbl.1.2 (2012), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/10inalcr.pdf (indicating that, for taxable year 2010, the number of
married filing jointly returns was 53,526,090 while the number of married filing separately returns was
2,532,292).
70
See I.R.S., FORM 1040 INSTRUCTIONS 79–91 (2012).
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I.R.C. § 63(c)(6)(A).
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assistance credit, adoption credit, earned income credit, and many tax
benefits for education.72
There is, however, a temporary reprieve for married individuals who
occupy, maintain, and furnish more than half the cost of a household that
their dependent child uses as a principal place of abode for more than half
the year.73 These individuals can qualify for head of household filing status,
but will return to married filing separately once the last child leaves home.
Naturally, this reprieve is unavailable to same-sex couples without children
or to the noncustodial spouse in a same-sex couple that does have children.
Unless one of the former spouses meets the residency requirements of a
state that will divorce them, this disadvantageous tax status will follow
them until they die.
d. Legal challenges.—The IRS guidance is likely to foster
uncertainty by breeding litigation challenging its validity. Same-sex couples
caught in the trap for the unwary described in the preceding section will
have good reason to challenge the IRS guidance, as the alternative rule of
determining marital status based on the couple’s domicile would, in many
cases, effectively end the marital relationship for federal tax purposes by
denying it legal recognition.74 But even more likely to spawn litigation is
the IRS’s choice not to recognize civil unions and domestic partnerships
that are the legal equivalent of marriage.
Just two years ago, the IRS indicated that it was open to recognizing
different-sex couples’ civil unions and domestic partnerships for federal tax
purposes—so long as those relationships were the legal equivalent of
marriage under state law.75 The letter conveying this position stated:
In general, the status of individuals of the opposite sex living in a
relationship that the state would treat as husband and wife is, for Federal
income tax purposes, that of husband and wife. . . . [T]he Illinois Religious
Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act provides that “[A] party to a civil
union is entitled to the same legal obligations, responsibilities, protections, and
benefits as are afforded or recognizes [sic] by the law of Illinois to
spouses . . . .” Accordingly, if Illinois treats the parties to an Illinois civil union
who are of opposite sex as husband and wife, they are considered “husband
and wife” for purposes of Section 6013 of the Internal Revenue Code, and are
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Id. §§ 21(e)(2), 23(f)(1), 25A(g)(6), 32(d), 221(e)(2).
Id. § 7703(b).
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Alternatively, if a couple is party to an evasive marriage and the IRS ultimately takes the position
that its guidance is intended to cover evasive marriages, then the couple might ask a state court to
declare their marriage invalid and avoid the need to divorce altogether. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
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Amy S. Elliott, IRS Memo Indicates Civil Unions Are Marriages for Tax Purposes, 133 TAX
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not precluded from filing jointly, unless prohibited by other exceptions under
the Code.76

Some commentators expressed surprise at this position, believing that
the most important factor in determining whether a couple is married for
federal tax purposes is whether their legal relationship carries the marriage
label under state law.77 In its post-Windsor guidance, the IRS reversed
course and embraced the commentators’ view by exalting the importance of
the marriage label and ignoring the legal equivalence of these relationships.
With absolutely no analysis at all, the IRS concluded:
For Federal tax purposes, the terms “spouse,” “husband and wife,”
“husband,” and “wife” do not include individuals (whether of the opposite sex
or the same sex) who have entered into a registered domestic partnership, civil
union, or other similar formal relationship recognized under state law that is
not denominated as a marriage under the laws of that state, and the term
“marriage” does not include such formal relationships. 78

It is this more recent position that is surprising, even a bit shocking. If
any area of federal law were to recognize domestic partnerships and civil
unions as marriages, one would expect it to be tax law because “[t]he
principle of looking through form to substance . . . is the cornerstone of
sound taxation.”79 Looking to substance rather than to form, domestic
partnerships and civil unions that are marriages all but in name should be
treated as marriages for federal tax purposes. What makes this position
shocking is the comparative lack of analysis supporting it. The IRS’s postWindsor guidance is quite detailed—much more than is typical of a revenue
ruling—and actually contains pages of analysis justifying the IRS’s
decision to adopt a gender-neutral reading of the gendered terms husband
and wife. The IRS went to great pains to explain why the labels husband
and wife should not control the tax consequences of married same-sex
couples but rather that it should be the equivalence of the legal relationships
that controls. In contrast, the IRS’s position on civil unions and domestic
partnerships is not the subject of similarly lengthy legal analysis; in fact, the
IRS provides no legal analysis to support its position at all.
Couples in civil unions and domestic partnerships are well-advised to
contest the IRS’s change in its position. There is no tax policy justification
for affording radically different tax treatment to couples who are in legally
similar relationships (with the exception of the label applied to those

76
Letter from Pamela Wilson Fuller, Senior Technician Reviewer, I.R.S., to Robert Shair, Senior
Tax Advisor, H&R Block (Aug. 30, 2011) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted),
available at http://www.proskauer.com/files/uploads/Documents/IRS-Letter-2011-on-Civil-Unions-inIllinois.pdf.
77
Elliott, supra note 75, at 794.
78
Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201.
79
Estate of H.H. Weinert v. Comm’r, 294 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961).
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relationships). The fact that the IRS made no attempt whatsoever to justify
this distinction in treatment—other than to point to the importance of labels
that it had just pages earlier argued do not matter—will only make this
guidance all the more vulnerable when subject to legal challenge.
By overriding the majority of states’ marriage laws, the IRS guidance
is plagued by the same federalism concerns that made Section 3 of DOMA
vulnerable to constitutional challenge.80 Although the states themselves may
have trouble establishing standing to challenge the IRS guidance on
federalism grounds,81 married same-sex couples caught in traps for the
unwary and couples (same-sex or different-sex) in civil unions and
domestic partnerships would have standing—and, more importantly, great
incentive—to challenge the IRS’s position. The inevitable litigation
challenging the validity of the IRS’s position will do nothing more than
breed additional uncertainty regarding the tax treatment of same-sex
couples post-Windsor.
e. Interaction with state tax law.—The IRS guidance will also
impose significant administrative and tax-filing burdens on married samesex couples in states that do not recognize same-sex marriage, just as
Section 3 of DOMA did to same-sex couples in states that legally
recognized their relationships. Pre-Windsor, same-sex couples whose
relationships were legally recognized by a state were normally required to
file two federal income tax returns using single or head of household
status.82 However, on their state income tax returns, these couples usually
could not file using single or head of household status.83 Because state
income tax laws often piggyback on the federal income tax, this created a
nonconformity of filing status (e.g., single or head of household at the
federal level and married filing jointly or married filing separately at the
state level). This noncomformity led to added complexity—and often added
compliance burdens—for same-sex couples.84 For example, commentators
predicted that “this nonconformity will produce higher tax preparation
costs, higher state audit risks (when states are confused by differences on
the state and federal returns), and more expense in dealing with state

80

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691–92 (2013); see supra notes 20 and 26, and
accompanying text.
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In contrast, Section 3 of DOMA clearly harmed states recognizing same-sex marriages, leading to
a constitutional challenge by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
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Carlton Smith & Edward Stein, Dealing with DOMA: Federal Non-Recognition Complicates
State Income Taxation of Same-Sex Relationships, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 29, 33 (2012).
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Id. at 49–50. Colorado’s civil union regime is a notable exception to this general rule. COLO.
REV. STAT. § 14-15-117 (2013).
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Smith & Stein, supra note 82, at 49–81.
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inquiries concerning conforming changes after federal audit changes have
been made.”85
Post-Windsor, the IRS’s approach to recognizing same-sex marriage
creates a mirror image of this problem. With valid same-sex marriages
recognized regardless of the law of the couple’s state of residence, same-sex
couples living in states that do not recognize their marriages will be
required to file as married filing jointly or married filing separately for
federal purposes but will be prohibited from using those statuses when
filing their state tax returns. This nonconformity will give rise to precisely
the same complexity and administrative burden that existed pre-Windsor; it
will just be a different group of same-sex couples that will be burdened
(i.e., those who are already saddled with state nonrecognition of their
relationships).
f. Entrenching the privileging of marriage.—The IRS guidance
also further entrenches the privileged status of marriage in the federal tax
laws instead of fostering the recognition of a more diverse array of human
relationships for federal tax purposes. Far from being marriage- or
relationship-neutral, the Internal Revenue Code has been characterized as “a
scheme of taxation where considerations of marital status are pervasive.”86
Pre-Windsor, the federal tax laws recognized only different-sex marriages
and traditional family structures built around different-sex married
couples.87
As described above,88 the IRS guidance takes a formalistic approach in
determining which relationships merit recognition for federal tax purposes.
According to the IRS, civil unions and domestic partnerships will not be
recognized for federal tax purposes, even if they are the legal equivalent of
a marriage. The IRS thus continues to confine the relationships that are
recognized for tax purposes to marriage—and, now, only to marriage,
without the possibility of recognizing any relationship that carries a
different label.
The IRS guidance effectively crowds out all other relationships and
permits marriage to occupy the field. In the short term, this creates a strong
incentive for couples in states with only civil unions or domestic
partnerships to travel to one of the states that will allow them to marry, so
long as that marriage will be valid and recognized for federal tax purposes.
In the long term, it creates a strong incentive for civil union and domestic
partnership states to abandon those relationship recognition regimes in
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favor of same-sex marriage. Moreover, any state that currently refuses to
recognize same-sex relationships but later considers a change in its legal
treatment of same-sex couples will choose to extend marriage to those
couples rather than explore alternative options that might be afforded to all
couples. For example, the District of Columbia currently provides couples
the choice between registering as domestic partners with a more limited set
of rights and obligations or to marry and have all of the rights and
obligations of married spouses.89 In the future, states will be less likely to
provide such different options for relationship recognition because the
federal tax laws place a thumb firmly on the scales in favor of marriage.
Had the IRS chosen to recognize domestic partnerships and civil
unions that are the legal equivalent of marriage, it would have taken a step
in the direction of loosening the grip that marriage has had on the federal
tax laws. By opening the door to alternatives to marriage, the IRS could
have laid the groundwork for eventually extending recognition to other
relationships that entail the same type of entanglement as marriage but
come with a more limited set of rights and obligations. For example, the
IRS might eventually have acknowledged that couples in reciprocal
beneficiary or designated beneficiary relationships make the same type of
commitment that led policymakers to rely upon marital status as a factor in
determining tax consequences. Instead, the IRS has chosen to ignore the
commitments made by some while honoring the commitments made by
others. This could result in adverse tax consequences for some and tax
benefits for others that are wholly unrelated to any tax policy justification
and are driven only by the choice to privilege marriage—and only
marriage—in the federal tax laws.
There is also reason to be concerned about the intersection of this
privileging of marriage with class (as well as race and gender)—a problem
highlighted at several points above.90 Income inequality in the United States
has been growing over the past several decades. Economists Anthony
Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez have shown that the share
of income going to the top 10% of the population in the United States has
significantly spiked since the 1970s.91 Research in the area of income
inequality has now begun to focus on how changes in family structure and
89

Prior to permitting same-sex couples to marry, the District of Columbia permitted them to enter
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composition affect income inequality and also have negative impacts along
lines of race and gender.92 Indeed, a review of this literature points to the
division of marriage along class lines (with decreases in marriage
concentrated at lower income levels) and concludes that “[t]here is strong
support for the hypothesis that increases in single mother families and
decreases in married couple families have increased income inequality.”93
Or, as the popular press has summed it up: “[S]triking changes in family
structure have also broadened income gaps and posed new barriers to
upward mobility. . . . [M]otherhood outside marriage now varies by class
about as much as it does by race,” and “marriage and its rewards [are]
evermore confined to the fortunate classes.”94 To the extent that there is an
association between marriage and growing income inequality, further
entrenching the privileged status of marriage in the tax laws—which are
often viewed as one of the primary tools for reducing income inequality—
may only exacerbate income inequality along lines of class, race, and
gender.
In light of the numerous problems associated with the IRS’s
implementation of the Windsor decision, we should take this opportunity to
pause and consider more fundamental reforms of the tax system—ones that
might both better address these problems and improve the tax system for
everyone. So long as the patchwork of legal recognition of same-sex
relationships continues among the states, the IRS is going to find it
impossible to come up with a workable and fair solution for addressing the
tax treatment of same-sex couples. With this future in mind, it is worth
recalling that commentators have for decades been leveling devastating
critiques at the choice to adopt the married couple as a taxable unit.95 This
literature suggests an easier and fairer approach than that adopted by the
IRS—one that would address the plight of same-sex couples and improve
the overall fairness of the federal tax system. Under this approach, we
would eliminate the privileging of marriage in the federal tax laws by
adopting the individual as the taxable unit. This approach avoids the need to
determine when and how to take same-sex marriage into account for federal
tax purposes. It also holds the promise of a relationship-neutral tax system
that could recognize a wide array of human relationships. Indeed, I have
elsewhere outlined a proposal for individual income tax filing that is
designed to recognize all economically interdependent relationships for tax
92
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purposes and not just those patterned after marriage or even those that are
conjugal in nature.96 The time is ripe to revisit such proposals and to
seriously consider their adoption.
CONCLUSION
Appearances can be deceiving. Just as the moon is not simply shiny
and bright but also pocked with the evidence of prior violent impacts, the
tax “equality” that same-sex couples have achieved with the invalidation of
Section 3 of DOMA seems appealing but is actually a terrain fraught with
the effects of prior discrimination and filled with new pitfalls for same-sex
couples and adverse effects on others. In fact, it is only after having attained
this “equal” status that the real work of achieving equal treatment for all—
whether married or not—begins.
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